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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN INVESTMENT 1 
COMPANY, a Partnership composed 
of W. ADRIAN WRIGHT, W. 
MEEKS WIRTHLIN, and A. P. 
NEILSON, Plaintiff-RespondentJ 
vs. 
JERRY SINE and DORA T. SINE, 
his wife, Defendants-A. E.Pellants. 
Case No. 
9622 
BRIEF OF APPELL~TS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action initiated by respondent, a partner~ 
ship, to quiet title to real estate originally conveyed by 
appellants to Albert P. Neilson, a partner, subject to 
the provision as contained in the instruments of con-
veyance which were recorded that the subject property 
should not be used for the erection of a motel thereon. 
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DISPOSITION OF LOWER CQURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment 
by the District Court for plaintiff defendants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in their favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT o:F FACTS 
The Metropolitan Investment Company, respond-
ent herein, is a partnership composed of W. Adrian 
Wright, ,V. Meeks Wirthlin and A. P. Neilson. (Com-
plaint, para. 1; R. 19 ). 
On October 26, 1956, A. P. Neilson signed an 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase Prop-
erty from appellants situated at 324 West North 
Temple Street, Salt Lake City, for a price of $16,500 
with the written stipulation that "This property shall 
not be used for the erection of a motel thereon" (Ex-
hibit 6) . Upon this property stood an apartment house 
having a front size of approximately 40 feet and a depth 
of 90 feet, consisting of eight rental units (R. 106). 
On October 30, 1956, Jerry and Dora Sine executed 
an 'Assignment of Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
whereby they assigned and set over to A. P. Neilson 
all their interest in the subject property in consideration 
of cash and of the covenant by A. P. Neilson that the 
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subject property "shall not be used for the erection 
of a motel thereon" (Exhibit 7) . Jerry Sine and his 
wife also executed a Quit-Claim Deed dated October 
29, 1956, to A. P. Neilson covering the subject property 
with the stipulation that "This property shall not be 
used for the erection of a motel thereon" (Exhibit 1). 
By Quit-Claim deed executed on November 5, 1956, 
A. P. Neilson and his wife conveyed to W. Adrian 
\Vright and his wife, as joint tenants, an undivided 
one-third interest in the subject real estate, and to W. 
Meeks Wirthlin and his wife, as joint tenants, an un-
divided one-third interest in said property (Exhibit 2) . 
Finally on November 21, 1956, the said three partners 
and their wives conveyed said property to Metropolitan 
Investment Company, the respondent herein (Exhibit 
4) . The Quit-Claim Deed signed by the Sines was 
recorded in the Office of the County Recorder of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, October 30, 1956 (Exhibit 1). 
Jerry and Dora Sine were in October, 1956, con-
ducting a motel business as a partnership. The partners 
opened and operated Se Rancho Motor Lodge, a large 
motel at 640 West North Temple, and Scotty's Romney 
Motel situated on North Temple between Sixth and 
Seventh West. Se Rancho and Scotty's Romney are 
both situated on the north side of North Temple Street. 
Se Rench is about three and one half blocks west of 
the subject property (R. 63, 65, 67, 100) and Scotty's 
Romney is one block further west ( R. 67) . 
Mr. Jerry Sine was cognizant of the fact that A. P. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Neilson was interested in motel properties, and he was 
not willing to sell the subject property to anyone who 
intended to use it in conjunction with other properties 
to construct a large motel. His motive for preventing 
a motel from being constructed on the subject property 
was to protect his motel business conducted as SeRancho 
and Scotty's Romney. Mr. and Mrs. Sine advertised 
by numerous road signs which, in part, attract guests 
originating from regions outside of Salt Lake Valley. 
If a large motel was erected, in part, on the subject 
property, appellants feared that .the business of Se 
Rancho and Scotty's Romney would be adversely af-
fected. Guests, especially those traveling from the 
north and south and turning onto North Temple Street, 
would be diverted into such motel, to the detriment of 
Se Rancho and Scotty's Romney situated to the west 
thereof (R. 5, 52, 68, 79, 90, 99, 100). 
Jerry and Dora Sine would not have transferred 
the subject property to A. P. Neilson for the cash con-
sideration received without the incorporation in the 
agreement of the covenant running to him and his 
assignees against the use of the property as a motel 
(R. 67). 
Metropolitan Investment Company, the respond-
ent, on September 30, 1960, agreed to sell the subject 
property to Western Travel, Inc. This company lias 
planned to build a motor hotel on the subject proeprty, 
and adjacent and surrounding properties. This corpo-
ration desires that the covenant against construction 
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of a motel on the subject property be avoided. The 
three partners of lVIetropolitan Investment Company 
own large blocks of stock in Western Travel, Inc. (R. 
47' 58, 49, 80, 82, 83, 84). 
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAL 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FIND-
ING (NO. 18) THAT SINCE OCTOBER, 1956, 
THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT AND SUB-
STANTIAL CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBOR-
HOOD AND AREA SU,RROUNDING THE 
"SUBJECT PROPERTY." 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT (NO. 14, NO. 22) THAT THE RE-
STRICTION WAS LIMITED TO CONSTRUC-
TION BY A. P. NEILSON PERSONALLY IS 
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OF 
RECORD. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
TH.._-\ T ~IR. AND MRS. SINE, THE APPEL-
LANTS HEREIN, AND ALL WHO MAY 
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CLAIM UNDER THEM, HAVE NO RIGHTS 
WHATSOEVER IN THE SUBJECT PROP-
ERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE AP-
PLICABLE LAW. 
(a) A legally enforcible promise may be made 
that the promisor will not engage in a busi-
ness in competition with a business to be 
carried on upon land of the beneficiary of 
the promise. 
(b) The promise of A. P. Nielson is binding 
upon Metropolitan Investment CompanyJ 
the appellantJ which took title to the prop· 
erty with full knowledge that the promise 
had been made. 
(c) The promise is enforcible even thought it 
is indefinite as to the duration of the obli-
gation created. 
(d) Change of neighborhood of the subject 
property has not occurred to the extent that 
the enforcibility of the covenant is affected. 
(e) The promise does not tend toward produc-
ing a monopoly of trade or business in the 
· area which includes the restricted land. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FIND-
ING (NO. 18) THAT SINCE OCTOBER, 1956, 
THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT AND SUB-
STANTIAL CH.A.NGE IN THE NEIGHBOR-
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HOOD AND AREA SURROUNDING THE 
"SUBJECT PROPERTY." 
The evidence on the other hand establishes that on 
and prior to October, 1956, motel properties were being 
operated and others planned for the area. Respondent's 
witness Meeks VVirthlin testified that several motel 
properties were prior to October, 1956, operated in the 
general area, such as City Center, Sea Gull, Mission, 
and Bob's. Mr. Sine testified that prior to October, 
1956, the newspapers of Salt Lake City published 
reports of the planned construction of a large motel 
by Utah Motor Lodge in the near area (Exhibit 13-P) , 
and that he and many others were cognizant of plans 
which had been drawn to construct another large motel 
in the general area to be known as City Center Motel 
(Exhibit 9-P) . The character of the neighborhood 
was set by 1956, and the subsequent changes followed 
the set pattern ( R. 34, 102, 107) . 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS O:F THE DISTRICT 
COURT (NO. 14, NO. 22) THAT THE RE-
STRICTION WAS LIMITED TO CONSTRUC-
TION BY A. P. NEILSON PERSONALLY IS 
XOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE OF 
RECORD. 
The reading of the covenant as contained in the 
instruments of conveyance proves that Mr. and Mrs. 
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Sine sought protection against acts of A. P. Neilson 
and his assignees. ~Ir. Wirthlin testified that it was not 
the intent that the property could be purchased and 
sold free of the covenant to third person ( R. 29) . A 
covenant by A. P. Neilson personally which could have 
been circumvented by mere transfer of title would have 
been entirely worthless. Mr. Sine did not want the 
property developed as a motel by Mr. Neilson nor 
those taking title from him with knowledge of the re-
striction (Exhibits I & 7, R. 28-29, 44, 59) . 
It is unquestionably true that Mr. Neilson intended 
to transfer the property to the partnership at the time 
he purchased it. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
THAT MR ... AND MRS. SINE, THE APPEL-
LANTS HEREIN, AND ALL WHO MAY 
CLAIM UNDER THEM, HAVE NO RIGHTS 
WHATSOEVER IN THE SUBJECT PROP-
ERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE AP-
PLICABLE LAW. 
(a) A legally enforcible promise may be made 
that the promisor will not engage in a busi-
ness in competition with a business to be 
carried on upon land of the beneficiary of 
the promise. 
In the instant case, A. P. Neilson acquired the 
subject property from the Sines for a consideration in 
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cash plus a promise that the acquired property would 
not be used for the erection of a motel. The motive of 
the Sines in exacting this promise was to shield their 
motel business carried on upon property located on 
the same street as the subject property from compe-
tition. 
Oliver vs. Hewitt (Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Va., 1950) 191 Va. 163, 60 S.E. 2d 1, involved the 
owner of a grocery store who conveyed two lots a short 
distance from his store by a deed which contained a 
provision that neither the grantees nor their assigns 
should sell groceries or bottled soft drinks in any 
building to be erected on the lots. The original grantees, 
after the dede was recorded, transferred the property 
to another who leased it to a person who commenced 
selling groceries and soft drinks on the property. The 
Court held that the sale of groceries and soft drinks 
should be enjoined so long as the promisee conducted 
his store for the sale of drinks and soft drinks. 
In Whitney vs. Union Railway Company, 11 
Gray 359, 71 American Decisions 715, the Court held 
that an owner of real property has the right so to deal 
with it as to restrain its use by his grantees within such 
limits as to prevent its appropriation to purposes which 
would impair the value of diminish the pleasure or en-
joyment of land which the grantor retains. 
In Restatement of Property by American Law 
Institute, Vol. 5, the following statement is found: 
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" * * Thus a promise may be made that the 
promisor will not personally engage in a business 
in competition with the business intended to be 
carried on upon the land of the beneficiary of 
the promise." (Page 3152). 
(b) The prornise of A. P. Nielson is binding 
upon Metropolitan Investment Company~ 
the appellant~ which took title to the prop-
erty with full knowledge that the promise 
had been made. 
Mr. A. P. Neilson, as a partner, owned a one-third 
interest in Metropolitan Investment Company. Mr. 
Neilson acquired the property with the intent of con-
veying it to the partnership and the conveyances to the 
partners occurred soon after Neilson's acquisition. 
Without question all of the partners were cognizant 
of the covenant in question. Mr. Wirthlin testified that 
Neilson acted for the partnership in making the pur-
chase (R. 38-39, 46). 
The promise respecting the use of the subject 
property was not intended to be purely personal with 
A. P. Neilson. Mr. Sine incorporated in both the 
Earnest Mo:r;:tey Receipt and Offer to Purchase and the 
Quit-Claim Deed the statement precluding the con-
struction of a motel on the subject property. Mr. 
Stanger was acting for all of the partners (R. 38-40). 
It was Mr. Sine's presumed purpose that recorded 
instruments should give notice to grantees of the re-
strictive covenant ( R. 60) . 
In the Restatement of the Law of Property by 
10 
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./unerican Law Institute, Vol. 5, the following com-
nlents are found: 
" * * Thus the failure to use the word 'assigns' 
in the making of the promise to erect and main-
tain a fence where none was in existence at the 
time of making the promise does not necessarily 
prevent the drawing of an inference that the 
promise was intended to bind the successors of 
the promisor. * * * 
" ***The probability that a promise respect-
ing the use. of land is intended to bind the suc-
cessors of the promisor is enhanced by the per-
manency of the situation apparently sought to 
be produced by the performance of the promise. 
The more permanent the situation intended to 
be produced, the more likely that succesors of 
the promisor were intended to be bound by his 
promise since the control of the land by the 
promisor himself may be but temporary." (Pages 
3197-3198). 
In this case, the sole control of the property by 
l\Ir. Neilson was indeed but temporary. 
In Hayes et al. vs. Gibbs (1956) 110 U. 54, 169 
P. 2d 781, it was held that one was chargeable with 
notice of restrictive covenants in deeds in his chain of 
title. 
The Court in Oliver vs. Hewitt, supra, held that 
regardless of whether a covenant not to use land for 
a certain purpose runs with the land, a court of equity 
will, nevertheless, enforce it against a grantee taking 
through a deed reciting the covenant and subject there-
11 
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to, or against a grantee taking title with full knowledge 
of its existence. 
(c) The promise is enforcible even thought it 
is indefinite as to the duration of the obli-
gation created. 
The fact that the promise respecting the use of 
the subject land was indefinite with reference to its 
intended duration calls for an ascertainment of the 
intention of the parties. This may be found from purpose 
intended to be accomplished. Mr. Sine sought to shield 
from competition. The duration of the covenant might 
be limited to the period of time during which he operates 
Se Rancho and Romney Motels. 
The cases are not in accord as to the duration of 
covenants where its duration is not specified. 
One view is that such covenants are presumed to 
continue for the duration of the estate created, and 
another is that such covenants will be limited to a 
reasonable time. The latter view appears preferable. 
(Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions-14 Ameri-
can Jurisprudence, Section 205, Page 615. See anno-
tation 95 ALR 458.) 
(d) Change of neighborhood of the subject 
property has not occurred to the extent that 
the enforcibility of the covenant is affected. 
The neighborhood when the promise was made was 
fast running commercial, and it was predictable from 
facts then known that many properties would be de-
12 
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veloped as motels. The need of protection from com-
petition by other motels was then apparent. 
The fact that the trend toward motel construction 
has accelerated does not constitute such a change of 
neighborhood as to nullify the promise here questioned. 
In 1-Iumphrey's et. al. vs. Ibach (1932) 110 N.J. 
Eq. 647, 160 AtL 531, the Court held that a change in 
neighborhood to afford relief must be so great as clearly 
to neutralize the benefits of the restriction to a point 
of defeating the object and purpose of the restrictive 
promise. See annotation 85 ALR 985. 
The increase of motel properties in the neighbor-
hood made the promise here given of more value to 
Mr. and Mrs. Sine and did not defeat its object. 
(e) The promise does not tend toward produc-
ing a monopoly of trade or business in the 
area which includes the restricted land. 
The mere fact that a promise restricts the use of 
land is not enough to render the promise illegal. In this 
case the restriction on use of the land cannot be held 
to create a monopoly. The evidence of record clearly 
indicates that the motel business is increasing in the 
neighborhood, even though the subject property has 
~ot been so developed. 
The question here posed is treated in Restatement 
of Law of Contracts by American Law Institute, Vol. 2 
as follows: 
13 
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"A buyer may make a reasonable contract 
restricting himself from using the property which 
he bought in a way that would compete with or 
harm the seller. The only limits imposed by the 
law on the owner of property restricting his 
power to exact contracts from a purchaser to 
refrain from using the property in a certain way 
are those imposed by public policy, and though 
public policy forbids unreasonable restraint of 
trade, and therefore forbids attempting to con-
trol prices on resale by a system of agreements, 
it does not forbid contracts which reasonably 
protect a business of either the buyer or the seller 
without tending to affect the public harmfully 
by monopoly or enhancement of prices. 
"Illustration . . . . 
"A sells Blackacre to B who promises as part 
of the transaction not to use it for mercantile 
purposes in competition with A. The promise is 
not illegal." (Para. 516, Page 998). 
The promise here involved could not possibly limit 
competition or control prices to a point of monopoly. 
In fact it was admitted by a witness for respondent 
that the property immediately adjoining the subject 
property could be used even though the subject prop-
erty was omitted. This witness, however, expressed 
the opinion that the incorporation of the property in 
the motel project would be desirable from an archi-
tectural point of view. 
SUMMARY .AND CONCLUSION 
This is a case where a person purchased land for 
use for motel purposes in connection with other motels 
14 
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in the vicinity which he and his wife owned (R. 63, 67). 
A. P. Neilson had a real estate agent approach the 
appellant; and in order to induce the appellants to sell 
the property, promised that it would not be used for 
motel purposes ( R. 66-67) . Except for these repre-
sentations and the restrictions in the deed and contract, 
appellants would not have made the sale (R. 66). Now 
the partnership for whom the land was originally pur-
chased asks the Court to free it of the restriction as an 
unenforceable covenant. Such should not be the ruling 
if it can be avoided. 
This brief shows the law to be that such covenants 
are enforceable, at least by the person who was the 
original covenantee. There is no question of a bona fide 
purchaser in this case, which might free the land of the 
restriction, and the evidence is that the purpose of Mr. 
Sine was consistent with his ownership of property at 
that time and the development of the neighborhood 
has been exactly along the line of the contemplated 
use, namely, for motel purposes. Appellant should have 
the benefit of the contract which the plaintiffs through 
its agent offered to the appellants when the contract 
of sale was entered into. Enforcement of the covenant 
would not be contrary to any public policy, and the 
judgment of the District Court should be reversed, and 
the restrictive covenant upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS, BIRD AND HART 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants 
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